Bottom line: International coverage of this story is far richer than what US audiences are seeing. The Zambia situation is not an isolated incident — it is the third in a cascade of African rejections, following Zimbabwe’s walkout and Kenya’s court suspension. African and European press have developed a coherent “biomedical extractivism” framework that links health data extraction to mineral extraction as parallel resource grabs. Meanwhile, China has made no public comment on the March 16 NYT story, but its deep entrenchment in Zambian mining ($3.5 billion invested, $5 billion more pledged) and symbolic moves into African HIV funding suggest Beijing views US overreach as a strategic gift.
ANGLE 1: China’s position in Zambia and the broader mineral race
China is already deeply embedded in Zambian mining
China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group (CNMC), a state-owned enterprise, has operated in Zambia since 1998 — making it China’s oldest African mining operation. CNMC runs the Chambishi copper mine, Luanshya Copper Mines (80% CNMC ownership), a major copper smelter, and several subsidiaries. Its Zambian operations sit on resources containing 4.51 million tons of copper and 162,000 tons of cobalt. More than 20 Chinese-funded mining enterprises currently operate in Zambia, and over 600 Chinese firms have invested in the Copperbelt Province, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Chinese Ambassador Han Jing confirmed these figures in October 2024.
In late 2024, Chinese mining companies launched the Chinese Mining Enterprise Association in Zambia (CMEAZ) and pledged $5 billion in new investment over five years to boost production to 280,000 tonnes of copper. Individual deals include a $680 million Luanshya New Mine Project (November 2025), a $830 million digital mining project at Chambishi (Africa’s first), and a $200 million Samba mine project. Historic cumulative Chinese investment stands at $3.5 billion over 26 years, creating 15,000 jobs. CMEAZ members paid $260 million in Zambian taxes in 2023 alone. This is the entrenched position the US State Department memo explicitly identifies as the problem — referencing “China’s preferential access to Zambian mines” and “China’s unfettered access to the country’s mineral wealth.”
China’s debt leverage and the restructuring backdrop
China is Zambia’s largest bilateral creditor. When Zambia defaulted on sovereign debt in November 2020 — the first African country to do so during COVID — it owed $4.1 billion to China’s Export-Import Bank out of $6.3 billion in total bilateral debt. China co-chaired the Official Creditor Committee with France and eventually agreed to restructure over 20+ years with a 3-year grace period. A separate $1.5 billion in commercial loans from China Development Bank and ICBC was restructured in September 2024. Zambia currently devotes roughly one-third of its national budget to debt repayment. Notably, the BBC quoted a Zambian government official saying: “There is no treating them [China] with kid gloves here. We don’t care whether we owe them, that’s not the issue” — suggesting Zambia does not view Chinese debt as creating automatic political deference.
No direct Chinese diplomatic response — but strategic positioning is visible
As of March 18, 2026, no Chinese Foreign Ministry statement has been found responding specifically to the NYT story or the PEPFAR-for-minerals revelations. However, several moves suggest China is positioning to benefit from US overreach:
Health aid gap-filling: In November 2025, China announced $3.49 million in HIV prevention funding for South Africa through the China Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and UNAIDS. The amount is tiny compared to PEPFAR’s billions, but it arrived precisely as South Africa was being excluded from US PEPFAR discussions amid a political row with Washington. This was reported by UNAIDS and the European AIDS Treatment Group. As the African Elements commentary noted on March 17: “Other world powers, such as China, are likely to use this controversy to their advantage. They may offer aid without the same ‘biomedical’ strings attached, even if their own deals have other costs.”
The TAZARA railway — a direct competitor to Lobito: China is revamping the Tanzania-Zambia (TAZARA) railway under a $1.4 billion, 30-year concession operated by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation. Tanzania’s finance ministry projects the railway will transport 3 million metric tons of minerals annually. This creates an eastern export route for critical minerals flowing to China and the Middle East — in direct competition with the US-backed Lobito Corridor, which runs westward through Angola to the Atlantic. Climate Home News, the Stimson Center, and ORF Online all cover this as a strategic infrastructure chess move.
Signal amplification: China Daily distributed a story headlined “Africa eyes new sources of funding for health” featuring quotes from Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya backing Zimbabwe and Zambia’s pushback positions — a sign Beijing is amplifying African resistance to US terms for its own strategic purposes.
The competitive gap across the continent is enormous
The scale of China’s African mineral position dwarfs the US presence. China controls over 72% of Congolese copper and cobalt mines (ORF Online). Of 33 cobalt exporters in the DRC, 24 are Chinese. China invested $57 billion in mineral extraction and refining across approximately 20 countries from 2000–2021, per Chatham House (March 2026). In 2024, the US accounted for only 1% of global critical mineral production. China refines 90% of rare earth elements and graphite, and 60–70% of lithium and cobalt. In 2023, the US invested $7.4 billion in energy and infrastructure in Africa; China invested over $21 billion. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence estimated that 90%+ of Africa’s forecasted lithium supply in 2024 came from projects at least partly Chinese-owned.
The US countermoves include the FORGE initiative (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement, launched February 2026), the Lobito Corridor ($550 million DFC loan, December 2025), a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the DRC (December 2025), and Project Vault ($12 billion public-private mineral procurement). The DFC’s financing capacity was expanded to $140 billion, with Africa as its second-largest portfolio ($10 billion). But analysts consistently note the gap remains vast.
A complication: the tailings dam disaster
On February 18, 2025, a tailings dam at Sino-Metals Leach Zambia (a CNMC subsidiary) collapsed, releasing approximately 51 million liters of toxic waste into the Kafue River, affecting water supply for roughly 60% of Zambia’s population. By September 2025, 176 farmers had filed an $80 billion lawsuit against Chinese mining firms. The US Embassy ordered American personnel to leave affected areas. This disaster is complicating the China-Zambia mining relationship and testing Zambia’s ability to hold foreign investors accountable — a dynamic that international press covers but US coverage of the PEPFAR story largely ignores.
FOCAC 2024 and the development aid competition
At the September 2024 FOCAC summit in Beijing (50+ African heads of state attending), Xi Jinping pledged approximately $51 billion in loans, investment, and aid over three years. Critically, this was the first FOCAC to explicitly commit to African mineral beneficiation — pledging to support “construction of local value chains, manufacturing development and deep processing of key minerals in Africa.” Two-way China-Africa trade exceeded $290 billion in 2024. African countries are increasingly leveraging this competition: at least 13 African countries enacted export restrictions since 2023 to capture more value chain, and Malawi banned all raw mineral exports outright in 2025.
ANGLE 2: African nations pushing back
Zimbabwe walked out first — and banned raw lithium exports the same week
The Zambia story is not the first domino. Zimbabwe formally terminated MOU negotiations with the US in late February 2026, before the NYT story broke. A leaked letter from Albert Chimbindi, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated the President directed officials to “discontinue any negotiations with the USA.” The letter described the proposed MOU as “clearly lopsided” and said it “blatantly compromises and undermines the sovereignty and independence of Zimbabwe.”
Government spokesperson Nick Mangwana provided the most quoted line across international press: “Zimbabwe was being asked to share its biological resources and data over an extended period, with no corresponding guarantee of access to any medical innovations — such as vaccines, diagnostics, or treatments — that might result from that shared data. In essence, our nation would provide the raw materials for scientific discovery without any assurance that the end products would be accessible to our people.”
On the same week as the walkout — February 25, 2026 — Zimbabwe imposed an immediate ban on all raw mineral exports including lithium concentrate, accelerating a policy originally scheduled for 2027. Mines Minister Polite Kambamura cited an “unacceptable scramble” by mining firms. Zimbabwe holds Africa’s largest lithium reserves (1.5 million metric tonnes of concentrate exported in 2025, generating $571.6 million). This simultaneous move — rejecting the US health deal and locking down mineral exports — is widely covered in African press but almost completely absent from US coverage of the PEPFAR story.
A critical detail US audiences miss: Zimbabwe leads 51 of 54 African countries in WHO negotiations on a Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) system. Bilateral US deals directly undermine this multilateral framework — which is part of why Zimbabwe rejected. This geopolitical dimension is nearly invisible in American reporting.
The human cost is real. US Ambassador Pamela Tremont stated the US faces “the difficult and regrettable task of winding down our health assistance in Zimbabwe,” affecting 1.2 million HIV patients. The Zimbabwe College of Public Health Physicians warned of “treatment interruption, increased transmission, the emergence of drug resistance.” PEPFAR covered 32–42% of Zimbabwe’s HIV spending (2018–2020), compared to the government’s 2–12%. The government committed to increasing health spending to 15% of budget and introduced an AIDS Levy.
Kenya’s courts halted the deal on sovereignty grounds
Kenya was actually the first African country to sign an MOU (December 4, 2025), worth $1.6 billion over five years. But Kenya’s High Court suspended the agreement after two separate legal challenges: one by the Consumer Federation of Kenya (COFEK), arguing it violates Kenya’s Data Protection Act, Digital Health Act, and Health Act; another by Senator Okiya Omtatah, arguing it undermines parliamentary oversight and public participation. Justice Chacha Mwita issued conservatory orders on December 19, 2025. The case returned to court February 12, 2026.
The Daily Nation (Kenya) reported the deal terms that sparked the challenge: Kenya must notify the US of any infectious disease within one day of detection, must consult Washington on response strategy, and must share pathogen specimens — with failure to do so potentially triggering funding cuts. The data-sharing commitment extends 25 years, far beyond the 5-year funding window. Kenya is not primarily a minerals target — its significance is strategic positioning and pathogen surveillance data.
The DRC’s deal is under constitutional challenge
The DRC signed a “Strategic Partnership Agreement” with the US on December 4, 2025, giving the US preferential access to critical minerals. In January 2026, DRC sent Washington a shortlist of state-owned assets including manganese, copper, cobalt, gold, and lithium projects for US investment. But on January 21, 2026, a collective of DRC lawyers and human rights defenders filed a constitutional challenge at the Constitutional Court. Attorney Jean-Marie Kalonji: “By filing this case with the Constitutional Court, we are assuming our responsibility as Congolese citizens to protect the sovereignty of our country and safeguard our patrimony for future generations.” Jean-Claude Mputu of “Le Congo n’est pas à vendre” (Congo Is Not for Sale) called it “a race for minerals at any cost... no promises have been made on human rights. None.”
South Africa’s Mining Minister directly challenged the US approach
At Mining Indaba in Cape Town on February 11, 2026, South Africa’s Mining Minister Gwede Mantashe publicly criticized the DRC for signing the US minerals deal, saying it “threatened the sovereignty of the continent’s states by intensifying the scramble for Africa’s natural resources.” He urged African states to “deepen collaboration” with each other: “It can’t be about you. It should be about us all in the region.” He reportedly clashed with his DRC counterpart at a ministerial meeting. Meanwhile, on February 6, 2026, South Africa signed the Framework Agreement on Economic Partnership (CAEPA) with China — a direct response to US “Liberation Day” tariffs. South Africa exports roughly 95% of its manganese ore to China.
Separately, the South African Medical Journal estimated that without effective transition, PEPFAR withdrawal could lead to 601,000 HIV-related deaths and 565,000 new infections over 10 years in South Africa alone.
Africa CDC and the AU are taking institutional positions
Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya stated publicly on February 26: “There are huge concerns regarding data, regarding pathogen sharing. We want to own our data in Africa. We want to own our future. We cannot accept not owning our data.” He said Africa CDC would support both Zambia and Zimbabwe in their positions, as well as the 17 countries that have signed MOUs.
At the 39th AU Assembly of Heads of State (early 2026, Addis Ababa), leaders adopted a resolution to develop a Continental Critical Minerals Value Addition Framework under Agenda 2063, explicitly recognizing minerals as a strategic lever for industrialization. Nearly 50 civil society organizations published an open letter calling on African heads of state to demand “equity and sovereignty” in bilateral health agreements. Namibia has gone furthest — banning export of unprocessed critical minerals and proposing 51% Namibian ownership for all new mining ventures.
Zambia’s own government is caught between pressures
In February 2026, Zambia acknowledged the deal “does not align with the country’s interests” and requested revisions (Reuters, February 25). A telling detail from international coverage: Zambia’s health minister Elijah Muchima denied the mining-health link on national television on February 15; three days later, President Hichilema fired him without explanation. Hichilema has publicly framed aid cuts as an opportunity to “take care of our own affairs” (Africanews), and Zambia increased domestic health financing by 30% since US cuts began. But with one-third of the budget going to debt repayment, filling the entire PEPFAR gap is not feasible. Opposition GPZ party president Jackson Silavwe issued a statement on March 17: “President Hichilema must not sign the deal that gives away our Nation’s birth right in mining... Zambia must not be involved in the battles of superpowers. Zambia remains a nonaligned nation.”
What international press is covering that US media is not
The gap between US and international coverage is substantial. Ten specific angles that are rich in international reporting but thin or absent in American media:
The cascade pattern. International outlets treat the Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya situations as three chapters of one story — a continental pattern of resistance. US coverage treats Zambia as a standalone scandal. Health Policy Watch (Geneva) has produced the single most comprehensive account tying all three together.
“Biomedical extractivism” as an analytical framework. Al Jazeera published a major analysis piece on March 13 by Tafi Mhaka (Zimbabwean columnist) headlined “US’s new scramble for Africa is biomedical imperialism.” It draws explicit parallels to colonial sleeping sickness campaigns in French Equatorial Africa (1921–1956) and Pfizer’s 1996 Trovan trial in Kano, Nigeria. It argues that “biological data has become as strategically valuable as oil, minerals or rare earths.” This framing dominates African intellectual discourse.
The actual MOU terms. The Guardian obtained the draft MOU before the NYT obtained the State Dept memo. Health GAP released the full 44-page document on March 17. Specific terms US audiences largely haven’t seen: the original US commitment was $1.5 billion, reduced to $1.012 billion (a “bait and switch” per multiple outlets); annual HIV funding would actually decline from $367 million to $320 million; Zambia must share pathogen data for 25 years; and the MOU requires monthly briefings between the Zambian government and the US Embassy on trade and investment — what Mpelembe Network (Zambia) called “commercial surveillance.”
The health minister firing. International press has reported that Zambia’s Health Minister Muchima was fired days after publicly denying the mining-health linkage. US press has not meaningfully covered this.
Zimbabwe’s simultaneous lithium export ban. Zimbabwe’s February 25 ban on raw mineral exports, announced the same week as the MOU walkout, is covered extensively in African mining press but barely registered in US coverage of the PEPFAR story.
The WHO Pandemic Agreement angle. Zimbabwe’s rejection is partly about protecting the multilateral Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) system being negotiated at WHO, where Zimbabwe represents 51 African countries. Bilateral US deals undermine this multilateral framework. This dimension is almost invisible in US reporting.
India, the UAE, and other competitors operating without coercion. Zee News (India) reported that India’s Commerce Minister finalized Zambia’s allocation of 9,000 square kilometers of exploration blocks for copper-cobalt in October 2025, offering “transparent technology transfers” — no aid leverage required. The EU has selected 60 Strategic Projects including Zambia partnerships. The competition is not just US versus China.
The Amani Africa think tank essay. The Addis Ababa-based think tank published “Africa and the New Scramble: A Call for Urgent Continental Action,” arguing: “Today’s scramble does not arrive with gunboats. It arrives through contracts, currency, legal instruments, digital infrastructure agreements, and critical minerals partnerships.” It identifies “fragmentation” as Africa’s primary strategic vulnerability.
Nigeria’s MOU conditions. Al Jazeera reported that Nigeria’s deal is contingent on Abuja “prioritising protecting Christian populations from violence” — suggesting the transactional conditions vary by country and extend beyond minerals.
The Nordic Africa Institute assessment. A February 9, 2026 analysis quotes researcher Mususa: trust was “severely undermined” when the US delayed Zambia’s health package in December 2025 linking it to minerals. The key insight: “What’s missing from the US approach is the sense that there is any dialogue, which is what African countries have with other investors like China.”
Source quality and coverage gaps
The strongest original reporting comes from The Guardian (obtained the MOU draft weeks before NYT), Health Policy Watch (Kerry Cullinan’s comprehensive multi-country coverage), Al Jazeera (Tafi Mhaka’s “biomedical imperialism” analysis), Health GAP (released full MOU text), and Down to Earth India (Cyril Zenda’s on-the-ground Zimbabwe reporting). The BBC’s Zimbabwe piece was widely syndicated across African outlets. Chatham House, ORF Online, and the Stimson Center provide the strongest analytical framing on China-US mineral competition.
Notable gaps: Le Monde, El País, and Deutsche Welle do not appear to have published major English-language coverage. Daily Maverick (South Africa), despite extensive prior PEPFAR reporting, has not yet published specifically on the March 2026 Zambia minerals revelations. No formal SADC statement has been found. Latin American press coverage in English is sparse.
Bias flag: China Daily’s distribution of the “Africa eyes new funding” story signals Beijing is actively amplifying African resistance narratives. Mpelembe Network (Zambia) uses advocacy-adjacent language (”shakedown”) that should be attributed carefully. Zambia’s Mines Minister Paul Kabuswe has flatly denied any mining-health linkage (”There is nothing linked to anything”), a counter-narrative reported by Zambian Mining News.
What a great interpretation of these evolving events here.
Especially the Zambia angle.
On point to the extreme.
Great job.